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from intelligence-led policy and practice in public policing 
 
 
Abstract 
Intelligence-led policing’s (ILP) promise to reform policing has attracted many to its 
cause. Based on empirical research, this paper challenges the validity of some of its 
claims and explains the ways that ILP may most fruitfully be employed. The research 
found that the success or failure of ILP depends on people and not on the ILP 
technologies, organizational structures, or processes that routinely receive attention. 
ILP may make perfect business sense in principle but human factors will always 
mitigate its prospects. Justifiably, ILP is the preferred strategy for combating 
organized crime or ‘professional’ criminals; the cost of investigations and intrusions 
into privacy can more readily be warranted. In the policing mainstream, an 
acceptable return on investment in those same methods is unlikely because the 
professional skills and specialist resources required to service them are in such short 
supply. Moreover, in liberal democracies their use is much more difficult to justify in 
social worlds that, properly, lie largely beyond the institutions’ control.  
 
Introduction 
The label ‘ILP’ is attached to a variety of strategies used by law enforcement agencies across 
the globe. As one of a range of innovative approaches meant to transform public policing in 
the information age, the brand represents optimism, positivity and dynamism; a smarter form 
of policing that provides staff with renewed drive and direction and that demonstrates - to 
staff, stakeholders, and communities - the institution’s capacity and willingness to fuse 
technology, data, and evidence of ‘what works?’ to transform moribund practice.i In England 
and Wales, ILP’s advocates promise more rational and scientific solutions to society’s ills; 
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approaches that no longer have to rely on that mix of knowledge, experience, and faith 
usually referred to as ‘professional judgement’; in reality, a term as mutable and elastic as 
‘affordable housing’ or ‘fair taxation’. 
A compelling case can be made for strategies that emerge from rigorous and 
transparent processes of collection, validation, and selection so that policing’s scarce 
resources are used in what, intelligence suggests, are likely to be the most productive and 
responsive ways. There is little evidence of that for ILP in the scholarly literature and 
certainly none to be found in the NIM narrative (see James 2013 and 2012). It is argued here 
that the acts of creative compliance associated with NIM implementation, that essentially 
created the fiction that ILP could and would revolutionise public policing, impeded 
understanding of its real value in the context of organised crime. Arguably, it also 
undermined the credibility of the service elite; with significant consequences for the 
institution.  
 
Methodology 
The aim of the study was to understand better the situations and circumstances in which those 
proactive policing methods that have come to be labelled as ILP, may most fruitfully be 
employed. The data collected to achieve that aim consisted of official reports, scholarly 
research and empirical data collected by the author in a study of the NIM (2005-12; N=147); 
from primary data collected during research into investigative practice in England and Wales 
(2012-14; N=201); and from research into the UK intelligence milieu (2013-15; N=113).ii In 
each case data were collected through surveys and semi-structured interviews with 
practitioners and others directly connected to the investigative and intelligence milieus. The 
NVivo narrative analysis software (which is rapidly becoming the sector standard for 
qualitative research) was utilised to make sense of the data. The research sample was drawn 
exclusively from social and organisational settings in England and Wales. Therefore, the 
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findings tend to be more relevant to those settings. Arguably, they also may be relevant in 
other contexts.  
The research does not, by any accepted definition, represent a longitudinal study but 
its results have been shaped by the author’s continuous observation of the policing and police 
intelligence milieus for more than 14 years. Whilst, individuals largely have not been tracked 
in these studies, the roles they fill have. Those roles expanded and contracted as police 
intelligence practice first grew and then, in this age of austerity for the public services, 
shrank. That has allowed for comparison of the data collected in each of the studies upon 
which this paper relies and for inferences to be drawn about the effectiveness and efficacy of 
that practice over time. No research participant is referred to directly in this paper save 
Officer A, at one time a senior officer in the Kent force, whose request not to be identified by 
name has been respected. 
 
Background 
Debates about the duties and responsibilities of the public police are unlikely ever to be 
settled; policing is a highly political and heavily politicised endeavour that polarises opinion; 
consensus sometimes is found but usually it is a fragile phenomenon that quickly can be 
undermined and lost. Something that most people can agree on is that policing should be 
founded on good information and sound reasoning whether it attracts the sobriquet 
‘intelligence- led’ or not. This paper argues against the extension of ILP into the policing 
mainstream. The author acknowledges that in that sense he very much is swimming against 
the flow. Largely, ILP has been seen as ‘a good thing’ and therefore above serious criticism; 
or at least that is how it seems. Robert Reiner, one of the foremost authorities on the 
development of public policing in Britain, observed whimsically that even if ILP is not the 
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panacea that some have suggested, it is infinitely preferable to stupidity- led policing (Reiner, 
2012). Few would disagree. 
Policing has always been so much more complex than simply preventing or detecting 
crime; most police work does not involve crime or criminals at all. Rather, the police deliver 
a range of services that no-one else is prepared or equipped to deliver or that involve 
‘something that ought not to be happening and about which someone had better do something 
now!’ (Bittner, 1974 p.1). That is to say, the police often must react to events over which, at 
least initially, they have little control. For example, in this study, managers expressed the 
view that 80 to 90% of police business was beyond their control and was incapable of being 
managed (see James, 2012). That of course highlights the dominance of the reactive 
paradigm in the mainstream, a feature of which is symbolism. Traditional policing represents 
series of highly symbolic acts by the state and its agents in attempts to impose order on the 
complexity, often bordering on chaos, that characterises democratic societies in the 
information age 
That same study also demonstrated the innate conservatism of the police elite. In 
2002, the police service of England and Wales introduced the National Intelligence Model 
(NIM). Essentially, this was an attempt to fuse traditional intelligence work with business 
processes with the aim of achieving more with less (arguably, given the recent budget cuts 
that have driven police forces to cut what they consider to be ancillary services – that often 
has amounted to doing less with less). Despite the public claims for the model, conservatism 
allied to executive indifference, and significant shortcomings in NIM and in its 
implementation limited meaningful acceptance of it to the intelligence milieu. 
Plans to extend ILP into the mainstream via NIM foundered because the 
organisational energy behind them, never matched the rhetoric. That was a deliberate act 
(perhaps more accurately, a deliberate omission). Shifts in the traditional relationship 
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between the people and the police epitomised by statements attributed to the founder of 
modern policing (such as: ‘the police are the people: the people are the police” – Peel cited in 
Reith, 1956 p.140) carry huge risks. Few managers were willing to endanger that relationship 
because they saw that the reforms required to operationalize ILP, threatened organisational: 
norms; identities; cultures; and values. Moreover, they were bound to test staffs’, 
stakeholders’ and communities’ normative expectations of the service.  
 
Policing paradigms 
Essentially, in standard practice, there are just two policing paradigms; ‘reactive’ and 
‘proactive’ but there are several variations on those themes including: community policing; 
problem-oriented policing; problem solving; and so on (see for example Audit Commission, 
1993; Tilley, 2003; 2008). The reactive paradigm represents the traditional ‘fire brigade’ 
style of policing that prioritises post-hoc investigations and a rapid response to reports of 
crime. It is a staple of crime fiction almost everywhere (often through the media of film and 
television) and therefore commonly represents what the populous understands as policing.  
Proactive strategies have been used in Britain and around the world for many years. 
However, they usually are employed in addition to, rather than as a replacement for, 
traditional reactive approaches and then only at the margins of policing activity (see James, 
2011 and Reiner, 2010). They are rarely significant factors in situations that demand 
immediate action, or in the kinds of tasks that usually are grouped under the heading of 
‘service delivery’, which together make up such a large proportion of police activity. 
Arguably, in the UK, the reasons for this go back to the origins of the public police at the 
beginning of the 19th Century.  
Fear of the contagion of revolution elsewhere in the world shaped Britain’s new 
police. Its sponsors and leaders recognised that public acceptance of the institution had to be 
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negotiated carefully. Therefore, at least publicly, police ‘spying’ was precluded and the role 
of the institution as preventer, rather than detector, of crime emphasised as a means of 
securing public consent for the new arrangements. That does not mean that the police did not 
conduct spying missions; just that for many years – almost until the end of the 20th Century in 
fact – they were rather adept at concealing this fact until legislation in the form of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, laid bare their covert 
strategies. 
Also relevant in this context, is the concept of ‘high’ and ‘low’ policing (Brodeur, 
1983). Initially applied solely to political policing and characterised as policing that aimed to 
control ‘by storing intelligence ... [gathered from] any domain that may further the 
implementation of state policies’ and the ‘processing of information, from which future 
events can be foreseen and, if need be, averted’ (Brodeur, 1983 pp.513 and 518) the term is 
now used much more loosely and encompasses a great deal of police proactivity. Usually it is 
interpreted as encompassing long-term investigations by specialist detective units that make 
use of informers, surveillance and the like. Brodeur’s conception of low policing as the 
disparate acts of criminal investigators carrying out their routine duties largely has stood the 
test of time but in the last 30 years the kind of intelligence work that traditionally was a 
feature of high policing has come to be much more a factor in the mainstream. Largely, that 
is because managers have looked to capitalise on their successes in the higher policing arena. 
 
Claims for ILP 
The true meaning of the term ILP has never really been settled. In Britain, it has been applied 
to a variety of crime-fighting processes that depend upon the efforts of analysts and other 
intelligence specialists, engaged inter alia in crime mapping, crime pattern analysis, and 
social network analysis, to target groups, individuals, and public space using covert methods; 
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with their arrest, or some other intervention to prevent further offending, the intended 
outcome. ILP sometimes has been confused with evidence-based policing (EBP). While they 
share some characteristics, EBP is not a policing model in its own right but a way in which 
‘researchers attempt to determine “what works best” for police forces… particularly in terms 
of the “crime-fighting” function of the police’ (Brunger et al, 2015).  
Commonly, the development of ILP has been linked to concerns about organised 
crime, the search for best evidence, and the discrediting of confessions as evidence. Initially, 
ILP attracted a great deal of scholarly interest - see for example: Tilley, 2003, Maguire and 
John, 2004; and Innes et al, 2005. Scholars broadly were positive but also were equivocal 
about its future prospects for ILP; arguing that it was too early in the strategy’s life, to assess 
its real impact on policing or on communities. Simply, the scholarly consensus was that ILP 
was promising and claims for it seemed reasonable but they were not yet proved. Kleiven’s 
(2004) study only confirmed those concerns.  
Arguably, policymakers and police professionals registered the positives but paid much 
less attention to the caveats that accompanied them. Certainly, there is little evidence that 
they were considered in any meaningful way. Enthusiasm for ILP has grown; unchecked and 
largely unchallenged (see for example: OSCE, 2016; and UNODC, 2006). ILP has been 
lauded as ‘scientific’; in common parlance, a method of inquiry is said to be scientific if it is 
based on empirical data. In this context, that data is in a form that can be managed, measured 
and used to provide evidence of what does and does not work and of course the crime 
mapping and other techniques applied in the ILP paradigm allowed the police to link and 
analyze data to identify crime hotspots, criminal markets and the like. It is claimed that the 
scientific method necessarily supports rational, targeted and cost-effective decision-making 
(Sweeten, 2016), which may well be a valid claim in an ideal world but no world is ideal. 
Policing’s complexities and contradictions are only compounded by the fact that almost all of 
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its actions are mediated by political and organisational factors including occupational 
cultures. That applies just as much to ILP as any other policing strategy. 
 
Hidden costs 
The research showed that the costs of ILP are less well understood but they may be 
considerable. Beyond the generic factors referred to earlier, the heavy emphases on data and 
direction, demand significant investment in information technology, skilled staff, and myriad 
processes needed to support the operation of systems, which include an intelligence-focused 
secretariat whose work is underpinned by the principles of the intelligence cycle and whose 
job it is to ensure that operational plans are lawful and otherwise accord with human rights 
principles. In other words, that the police’s responsibilities under the Human Rights Act, 
1998 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000 are fulfilled. 
One of the most significant operational costs is incurred in developing a cohort of 
officers, to be held in reserve, capable of dealing effectively with the intelligence that is 
collected. Readers will be well aware that in the real world police resources are scarce; there 
are not troops of officers standing by around the world, waiting to respond to the next lead 
supplied by their intelligence departments. Ordinarily, staff are fully employed. Therefore, 
that ‘spare’ capacity has to be created by stripping away resources from other departments, 
making tough choices on the basis of subjective analyses of need. Choices that always have 
the potential to generate tension between police managers and their local stakeholders and to 
stimulate conflict in their communities. Moreover, staff rarely welcome change; resistance 
(often covert in nature) is the norm. Unsurprisingly, few managers have been willing to tread 
that path.  
In Britain, the experiment that seems to have been truest to the ILP ideal was the Kent 
Policing Model (KPM). Wholly committed to the cause and driven on by a charismatic and 
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powerful leader, the Kent force seemed to embrace ILP with a passion. Intelligence practice 
was prioritised, patrols were redeployed so that they were available during periods and in 
places that intelligence analysis had determined had the greatest policing needs and novel 
policing methods were embraced. This policing nirvana was short lived.  
Many communities and local stakeholders complained that their needs were being 
neglected; the complaints reached such a volume that one of the force’s senior officers 
attended more than 300 community and local council meetings to keep the plan on track 
(Officer A, personal communication with the author, May 2010). Despite the officer’s efforts, 
the force was obliged to return patrols to town centres and the like, even though there was no 
intelligence to support those redeployments. Readers may feel it noteworthy that despite the 
rhetoric around the success of the KPM, it was never subjected to independent scrutiny 
(James, 2013; Amey et al, 1996). It has now faded into history to be replaced, in the words of 
Kent’s Police and Crime Commissioner, by a more traditional ‘locally-focused service’ 
(Barnes, 2016 p.2). 
 
The limits of ILP 
That managers often have shied away from making decisions about resource allocation that 
may privilege one section of the community over another, destabilize the organisation, or 
explode the myth that the police institution is not just a ‘can do’ but a ‘can always do’ kind of 
operation should not surprise anyone. The image of the public police as the primary agency 
of social control, standing ready to defend the state and its citizens whenever needed, remains 
highly symbolic even if, in the information age, some are a little less convinced by that 
depiction than once they were. 
All policing decisions carry political risks. Most managers operate in virtual goldfish 
bowls; their actions, behaviours, and pronouncements questioned at almost every turn (see 
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for example; Caless, 2011). Arguably, if they can mitigate some of those risks and deflect a 
portion of the criticism that comes their way, they will. That would be only human. Though 
an undesirable consequence of such action is the phenomenon of creative compliance where 
managers invest enough intellectual capital and generate enough organisational activity to 
give the impression that tough decisions are being taken and substantial changes being made 
when in fact nothing very meaningful is happening at all. That certainly was a significant 
feature of the story of the UK’s NIM (James, 2012).  
Formal rules (such as the NIM’s statutory code) are merely presentational; justifying 
conduct but not affecting practice in meaningful ways. Reiner (2010) describes that kind of 
behaviour as interactionist. In that context, making sense of policing subcultures is the key to 
understanding practice. Arguably, compliance for its own sake represents the worst of both 
worlds. It may, in some small way, buttress the police’s image but it also results in the 
dissipation of public money and other scarce resources with little tangible effect. Certainly, 
few of the ILP strategies that have come to be cited as evidence of best (or at least better) 
practice, and therefore worthy of imitation, have been subjected to meaningful independent 
scrutiny beyond that carried out into the NIM (see for example: James, 2013 and 2012; 
Collier, 2006; and Kleiven, 2004). 
 When ILP is, or is perceived to have been, applied inappropriately, it may threaten the 
very legitimacy of public policing. One has only to consider the consequences of the ILP 
operation that led to the police shooting of Mark Duggan in North London in 2013 to 
understand the fragility of the social contract that underpins policing. Whereas traditional 
reactive policing largely relies upon members of the public deciding when a situation has 
become so intolerable that it demands an intervention, proactive approaches prioritise 
‘agendas set by the police’ (Maguire, 2008 p.437). The fundamental difference between the 
two paradigms is that in the former it is the public’s and not the police’s definition of order 
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that usually takes precedence. In contrast, proactive policing often entails the imposition of a 
police conception of order and the arbitrary reconstruction of the social world (Waddington, 
1993). 
Philosophical issues like these may not be of the greatest concern to action-oriented 
practitioners but there are, equally valid, instrumental factors that should be of concern. The 
development of an ILP paradigm in the mainstream can have a meaningful and measurable 
impact only if it is accompanied by substantial organisational change (Flood and Gaspar, 
2003). Despite the police’s best efforts to do more with less (which arguably has sometimes 
amounted to doing less with less – see for example Whitehead, 2011 on the subject of case 
screening and Merrill, 2015 on police non-attendance at crime scenes), the need for that kind 
of reform has proved a significant obstacle to the implementation of ILP. Change on such a 
scale invariably threatens the established order, the culture and identity of the organisation 
and the norms, values and morale of its staff; largely it has been disdained. That has meant 
that the service has been unable to create the operational reserves – working hand-in-glove 
with intelligence staffs – that a meaningful commitment to ILP demands.  
These kinds of contradictions were evident in the NIM narrative (see James, 2013 and 
2012). The consequences were a bifurcated approach to policing problems with intelligence 
units creating performance-related data rather than influencing the deployments of the 
operational teams whose activities remained largely reactive in nature. Even though the 
police understood the intelligence picture more clearly, their ability to influence it in 
significant ways was no greater than it was before the NIM was introduced.  
ILP demands a range of skills and abilities that are not routinely found in the 
mainstream. Most of the activities encapsulated by the term involve intrusion into the lives of 
citizens. Such intrusions are legitimate only when they are proportionate, lawful, and 
accountable, and can be shown to be necessary for a policing purpose. These are simple 
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terms, nevertheless they carry a powerful message about the human rights of citizens and 
their relationships with the state and in the modern era that has been reflected in the 
legislative and regulatory arrangements that have provided the, previously lacking, legal 
certainty around these kinds of policing activities.iii Assessing the validity of a plan to intrude 
into, for example, an individual’s private space demands expertise in law, professional skill 
and emotional intelligence. Making the case for such an intrusion requires the investigation 
of existential as well as legal and practical matters. The expertise required for this work is 
found largely in specialist units.  
Those staffs use that expertise to create for themselves the networks of national and 
international contacts that they need to obtain in timely and efficient ways the information 
they require. Policymakers may wish fervently for practitioners to embrace the kinds of 
transparent institutional arrangements for intelligence sharing that, for example, the Interpol 
and Europol databases aim to provide but long experience has shown that in this context the 
wish is rarely father to the thought (see for example, Safjański, 2013). This kind of behaviour 
cuts across a number of the intelligence pathologies reported by Sheptycki (2004) and others 
(see also for example; Stanier, 2012). In it, there are elements of institutional friction, the 
information silo effect and the tensions between different occupational subcultures (all 
highlighted by Sheptycki). Seemingly, no matter how much organisational energy is 
committed to those endeavours, the norm is that professionals use trusted contacts, rather 
than official channels, to gather or share information whenever that option exists (see for 
example, Occhipinti, 2015). A proper analysis of that behaviour, arguably worthy of the 
pathology label in its own right, is beyond this paper but this is yet another example of the 
significance of human factors in policing practice. 
In Britain, staff in the mainstream rarely can match the knowledge and experience of 
their specialist colleagues and they are unlikely to have anything like as comprehensive a 
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network of national and international contacts. As the author’s study into intelligence practice 
revealed (James, 2016), staff in local policing units receive only rudimentary training and 
must rely heavily on internally generated guidance documents (currently in the form of 
Authorized Professional Practice – see CoP, 2016). Nevertheless, they must make the same 
kinds of decisions as their more experienced and better trained colleagues. That places a 
heavy responsibility on those routinely asked to make judgements about the proportionality, 
legality, and necessity of actions that may hazard the finances and reputation of the institution 
and that have the potential to undermine prosecutions.   
That is not to deny the positive and beneficial effects that ILP may have at the margins 
of policing. Most police services seem to understand that, applied appropriately, ILP is 
invaluable to the policing mission (see for example Hogan-Howe, 2012). Throughout the 
history of the public police, managers frequently have created specialist squads and 
departments to deal with different crime types (often linked to the activities of organised 
crime groups; such as human or drug trafficking) or with discrete policing problems (such as, 
environmental harm-inspired protests) (see Creedon, 2014). That has proved an effective 
strategy (if recently in Britain, a controversial one) that has ‘worked’ for at least 130 years. 
 
The limits of policing  
For many years, the policing institution was effective at lobbying its political masters 
(Savage, 2007). It continues to pride itself on being a pragmatic task-focused organisation but 
despite its rhetoric, its powers now are much more limited than once they were (see Winsor, 
2012). Nonetheless, despite managers’ oft-repeated wish to stand outside of politics, all 
policing is political. To many outside the policing ‘bubble’, ostensibly utilitarian acts 
commonly amount to efforts to preserve the status quo; invariably, police action privileges 
the rights of the powerful (and often, propertied) over those of the powerless. That should not 
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be interpreted as a criticism of the police institution or the people who represent it. Rather, it 
is a recognition of their historic and traditional roles in liberal democratic societies and an 
acknowledgement of the limits of their influence over their political masters; and their power 
over those they police. 
Any number of police managers and public policymakers have shown themselves 
willing to be held as hostages to fortune, launching initiative after initiative with optimistic 
messages emphasising the police’s crime-fighting capabilities and the organisational and 
personal vigour with which they will be pursued. Taking visible and decisive action against 
offenders and being seen to take such action, has proved politically popular and, arguably, 
has strengthened policing’s claims for legitimacy. Invariably, these pronouncements have 
been received enthusiastically; not least within the ranks of the institution itself where ‘thief-
taking’ and ‘locking up the bad guys’ are perceived to be central to the policing mission even 
if (as a proportion of the work) that is far from the truth.  
Political safety valves can take many forms; reform is one. In the context of British 
policing, the putative introduction of ILP at the beginning of the 21st Century inter alia can 
be interpreted as an institutional response to successive Governments’ attempts to reform 
what they saw, and what Government continues to see, as a costly, inefficient, and 
discriminatory body. ILP promised much; the ability to harness together the scientific 
advances in communications and information technology of the age, with novel, rational, 
targeted strategies to deliver cost-effective, efficient, and accountable policing. It found 
powerful supporters in Government and, for a time, it allowed the service to deflect criticism, 
which had been building for over 10 years, of its performance and values. However, it was 
only a question of time before it was recognised that rather than the meaningful, structural, 
reform Government expected, policing’s enthusiasm for ILP represented no more than 
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‘business as usual’ – the standard organisationally and culturally-consistent response by the 
police elite to a perceived crisis.  
 Arguably, the impact on Britain’s police service has been considerable. Even if its 
failure to deliver smarter, intelligence- led, policing is but one factor in the demise of police 
power, it is a significant one and its story provides an object lesson in the consequences of 
promising more than one reasonably can deliver. Policing has lost its ‘special relationship’ 
with Government; its elite members’ group has been stripped of much of its authority and 
rebranded; the Police Federation, the staff association that represents the rank and file, finds 
itself under sustained attack from the Home Secretary who inter alia has stripped its senior 
officials of public funds and ended the practice of automatic enrolment into the Federation 
for sworn staff. Moreover, in this age of austerity for Britain’s public sector, policing has 
borne the brunt of public sector budget cuts.iv 
Though it may still be an actor in structuring and shaping both political behaviour and 
public policy, the power of the institution to reshape the social world is, and from a 
libertarian perspective should be, finite. That is inter alia because of the disaggregated nature 
of modern societies and because so many aspects of human and organisational behaviour are 
beyond its control; for example, the institution has only the most limited influence on 
Government policy in relation to, education, housing, employment, or health, which in many 
cases are the drivers of the deviance that ultimately it may be called upon to address.  
 
Conclusions 
Intelligence-led policing’s (ILP) brand is strong. Its promise to help modernise and reform 
policing using a novel blend of processes, structures and the technologies of the age has 
attracted many to its cause. Data were collected through qualitative empirical research into 
ILP and detective work over a period of 14 years. Thematic analysis of that data using sector 
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standard software found that regardless of how advanced those processes, structures and so 
on may have been or how much vigour was employed in their name; the success of any 
policing initiative can never be guaranteed.  
A key finding was that success or failure depended not on the ILP technologies, 
organisational structures, or processes that routinely receive so much attention but on people. 
In this context, the people assigned to collect the intelligence and to carry out intelligence-
directed tasks, and the stakeholders and other people in communities who were affected by, 
or otherwise had an interest in, those activities. Ultimately, the failure of ILP, or indeed any 
putatively innovative strategy, to revolutionise public policing should come as no surprise. 
Revolutions seldom are ‘glorious’;v their outcomes usually are hugely difficult to predict. 
Moreover, few welcome changes that may threaten established norms, working practices, 
organisational stability, continuity, power and so on. Even fewer people have the support and 
the revolutionary zeal to contemplate what may be tumultuous change on such a scale. These 
phenomena are interconnected: some in obvious, others perhaps in more nuanced ways but 
they add up to the reality that in liberal democracies, with their checks, balances and safety 
valves, revolutions are rare; that applies in the context of state institutions just as much as it 
does of nation states.  
Policing is complex human activity; success cannot be measured by results alone. 
Sometimes, its multiple strands of policy, strategy, organisational behaviour and so on (a list 
that potentially continues almost ad infinitum) cannot be unpicked and the challenges of 
attributing cause to effect – in this context, strategies to outcomes - simply may be too great. 
That may be nigh on impossible when, as is often the case with ILP, the outcomes one seeks 
to isolate are linked to strategies used to prevent or disrupt criminal acts before they take 
place. The challenges of proving a negative are well understood. That has not dissuaded some 
policymakers from making claims for the success of this or that strategy to increasingly 
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sceptical publics.vi Those claims sometimes seem to be based on faith or at least on the 
grounds that the ‘absence of evidence [for their success] is not evidence of absence’.vii  
 Acceptable returns on investment in ILP are unlikely in mainstream policing where 
the knowledge, professional skills and specialist resources required for the work are in short 
supply and where the pressures on the police to carry out an almost infinite array of tasks 
with finite resources is so immense. If one of the foundations of modern policing; that the 
police are the people and the people are the police, is to be maintained then the responsibility 
for achieving those tasks must be shared between the two. Finding the right balance has 
proved to be no easy thing; it must constantly be renegotiated. That is unlikely to change, 
there are just too many variables in that relationship but surely its future health demands that 
the interests of communities should be to the fore and the public’s definition of order given 
precedence in mainstream policing in the information age, through that variety of approaches 
that have come to be understood collectively as community policing.  
Against this backdrop, it is easy to lose sight of ILP’s strengths. When it is employed 
appropriately, they are considerable. Organised crime groups and those who plot to do harm 
to communities and/or the state, simply cannot be tackled effectively unless they are 
identified, understood, and targeted for sustained periods by highly knowledgeable and 
skilled staff with access to specialist support and a combination of proven investigative tools 
and technologies and the networks that provide the means for effective collaboration and 
cooperation with law enforcement professionals elsewhere in the world. Largely this is how 
public policing has operated in liberal democratic societies for decades and there is scant 
evidence that ILP, or any other putatively new strategy can change that picture in meaningful 
ways.  
Simply, it is in the higher policing context, characterised by that already long-running 
battle between serious and/or organized crime and law enforcement specialists, that the 
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maximum return on investment in intelligence-led policy and practice will be achieved. That 
is where scarce resources should be directed rather than being dissipated in the mainstream 
where the risks – associated with legal process, the maintenance of the social contract, 
community cohesion, and human rights compliance – are far outweighed by the potential 
rewards. ILP’s promises have proved a heady mix that policymakers and police managers 
have found difficult to resist but the cost of ILP; its demands on the finite resources of police 
organisations, and its – largely unacknowledged - threat to the legitimacy of the public 
police; means that without significant, structural, reform it must remain at the margins of 
policing. The view that ILP can revolutionise public policing is a chimera; and a costly one at 
that. 
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